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UNEQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN AT-WILL
EMPLOYMENT: THE SEARCH FOR A
REMEDY
INTRODUCTION
A contract of employment, by its nature, differs from an or-
dinary business contract for fungible goods and services because
people are unique individuals possessing distinct talents,
strengths, and weaknesses, not merely inputs to production.1
Moreover, people earn the necessities of life-food, clothing, and
shelter-by working in productive employment2 and they rely
upon their employers to supply and contribute to work-related
benefits such as health and life insurance, retirement plans, and
Social Security.!
1 See generally Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-
Will World, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1655 (1996) (seeking just cause discharge for all em-
ployees); Samuel Issacharoff, Contracting for Employment: The Limited Return of
the Common Law, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1783, 1800 (1996) (arguing that "the employee's
expectations and societal role associated with employment imbue the relationship
with a value beyond that of simple exchange). But see John P. Frantz, Market Or-
dering Versus Statutory Control of Termination Decisions: A Case for the Ineffi-
ciency of Just Cause Dismissal Requirements, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 555
(1997) (asserting factual and theoretical deficiencies in the reasoning that promotes
the elimination of the at-will employment doctrine).
2 Work is an important element in the stability of society. Thus, an individual's
right to employment should be an important state interest and should receive a high
degree of protection from the state. See William B. Gould, IV, The Idea of the Job as
Property in Contemporary America: The Legal and Collective Bargaining Frame-
work, 1986 BYU L. REV. 885, 892 (asserting that "in a modem industrialized econ-
omy employment is central to one's existence and dignity").In England and the United States, before the laissez faire attitude of the late
nineteenth century, the employer was responsible for employee wages as well as
employee welfare. Employment in the United States today usually includes these
same kinds of pre-laissez faire benefits. See generally PHILIP SELZNICI, LAW,
SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 128-29 (1969) (stating that, although duty was
not clearly defined, in the master and servant relationship, the master was respon-
sible for the servant's general welfare and for the provision of certain protections for
the servant); Jay M. Feinman, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule, 20
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 119-22 (1976) (discussing the early English law presump-
tion that employment was for one year because, among other reasons, there was a
need to protect the servant from being let go in the slow season without the means
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A person may believe that working long hours, performing
well, behaving ethically, and remaining loyal to an employer will
eventually be rewarded with job security, which is valued quite
highly because employment is an integral and crucial aspect of
one's life.4 The truth, however, is that most employees are at
will, which means they can be terminated by their employer any
time, for any reason or for no reason.' When an employee loses a
job, especially after years of quality performance and loyalty to
an employer, it can be quite a shock.6 The loss of a job is not only
an economic catastrophe but also a psychological and emotional
disaster for both the employee and his or her family.7 The nega-
tive aspects of unemployment also affect society by idling labor
resources and by burdening society's public welfare systems such
as unemployment compensation, welfare, food stamps, and
to support himself).
' See, e.g., Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 308 N.W.2d 459, 462 (Mich. 1981)
(stating that "a mere subjective expectancy ... that an employee doing competent
work would be retained as a company asset ... is insufficient to establish a contract
implied in fact" and thus, the employee had no cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge).
5 An at-will contract means that "the employment relationship may be termi-
nated by either the employer or employee without notice and for any reason."
ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 2.27, at 78 (1994). "'The actual contract may
be oral or written; express or implied by the conduct of the parties; bilateral or uni-
lateral." Id.
Some employees think they can sue their employer just because they have
been fired. This is true if the employee has a term employment contract, a
union contract, or a wonderful employee handbook. Most employees do not.
They are at-will employees and can be fired for no reason at all.
DARIEN A. MCWHIRTER, YOUR RIGHTS AT WORK 59 (1989).
6 Even as companies came out of the recession of the early 1990's and began to
make profits again, workers continued to be laid off. The Wall Street Journal re-
ported that "M1]ast week Mobil Corp. posted soaring first-quarter earnings. This
week, it announced plans to eliminate 4,700 jobs." Matt Murray, Thanks, Goodbye:
Amid Record Profits, Companies Continue to Lay Off Employees, WALL ST. J., May
4, 1995, at Al. One laid off employee said" i thought they wanted people like me,
who would give up their lives and do anything to keep their jobs' ... 'I felt like a rat
running on one of those little wheels.' "Id. at A6.
7 See Note, Finding a Place for the Jobless in Discrimination Theory, 110 HARV.
L. REV. 1609, 1609 (1997) (stating "the unemployed are subject to a host of difficul-
ties, including identity crises imposed from within and without, social and familial
stigmas, and health complications") (citing SUE GLYPTIS, LEISURE AND UNEM-
PLOYMENT xi (1989)). See generally NICK KATES ET AL., THE PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACT
OF JOB LOSS (1990) (discussing the biophysical consequences of job loss and the lack
of political intervention to seek social policy solution); Shari Caudron, Teach Down-
sizing Survivors How To Thrive, PERSONNEL J., Jan. 1996, at 39 (stating that even
those who survive employment cuts from corporate downsizing experience "pain,




The relationship that exists between an employer and an
employee determines the rights and duties of both parties and
should confer a status upon the parties as well as a contractual
relationship.9 A system of employment at-will that subjects a
person's livelihood and status to the whims of an employer is un-
fair and fosters societal instability.' Thus, the legal system that
initiated and continues to support this system must remedy the
inherent unfairness of the employment at-will doctrine."
" See Donald F. Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, 62 VITAL SPEECHES 691,
691 (Sept. 1, 1996) [hereinafter Hastings, Guaranteed Employment] (stating that
fear of job loss causes "stresses and uncertainties [that] can be a major drain on
productivity, as well as a force undermining families and communities"). "The stress
[of being laid off] can contribute to a range of physical ailments ... from insomnia to
... stomach problems, irritable-bowel syndrome, spastic colon, migraines, [and] sleep
disorders." Murray, supra note 6, at A6.
In the employment relationship the law of agency applies. "Agency is the fi-
duciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent
by the other so to act." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1996). An employee
who is given authority by an employer can bind the employer to business commit-
ments. The employer, on the other hand, through the rationale of respondeat supe-
rior is responsible for the actions of an employee while the employee performs his
job. "Let the master answer .... Under [the respondeat superior] doctrine an em-
ployer is liable for injury to person or property of another proximately resulting
from acts of [an] employee done within [the] scope of his employment in the em-
ployer's service." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311-12 (6th ed. 1990). Thus, by virtue
of the employment relationship status, the law creates certain rights and duties.
In the law this is not unusual. The law combines contract and status in the
marriage relationship. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1888) (stating
that marriage "is something more than a mere contract"). The state has an impor-
tant interest in marriage as a basis of society. See id. at 204-05. Although a man and
a woman can freely enter into a marriage contract, they must obtain a state license
and they cannot dissolve the marriage merely by deciding to breach the marriage
contract. See id. at 210-14. They must instead invoke state action to do so. See id.
10 "[Clompanies must remain competitive and profitable, but the way to do that
is through encouraging productivity and engineering, not through terrorizing and
demoralizing employees and devastating communities. It is a matter of common
sense. We cannot have healthy businesses with the context of disruptive families in
a decaying society." Donald Hastings, The Role of Incentives, Profit Sharing, and
Employee Participation in the Development of Human Resources in the United
States, 22 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 135, 139 (1996) [hereinafter Hastings, Role of Incentives].
"' Law and Economics theorists completely disagree with this point. See Frantz,
supra note 1, at 558 (asserting that the at-will presumption should be retained be-
cause of its "comparative efficiency."). See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW (4th ed. 1992); Peter Stone Partee, Reversing the Presumption of
Employment At Will, 44 VAND. L. REV. 689 (1991); Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle
Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8
(1993). These scholars assert that the principles of economic theory should be ap-
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Presently, the at-will rule is so deeply entrenched within
this country's judicial decisions that any deviation from the doc-
trine is viewed by the courts as a heresy that should not be insti-
tuted.' However, replacing the at-will principle with a just
plied to the employment relationship. They argue that each party-employer and
employee-will look out for his or her own best interest in bargaining for the details
of the relationship, will maximize his or her interests and, thus, the outcome will be
in the best interests of each party. See Frantz, supra note 1, at 559. However, this
argument overlooks the fact that economic models hold all variables constant in or-
der to postulate theory. Law affects real human beings and their individual lives
and should not be formulated in abstract models that hold the real world constant.
The law must be concerned with the real psychological, emotional, and monetary
effects of law on individuals, their families, and society. The Law and Economics
group also postulates that "[ilf provision of job tenure did increase productivity
enough to offset its costs, employers would provide it without legal compulsion." Id.
at 571. If employers were legally required to discharge for cause only, they would
find a way to make their organizations efficient and productive. The costs, moreo-
ver, that are included in the Law and Economics analysis are only monetary costs to
the employer. The societal costs (for example, for increased unemployment insur-
ance, increased taxes for welfare payments, and increased payments of medical
benefits due to psychological and emotional trauma of unemployment) that are
passed on to individuals and corporations are not figured into the analysis.
The Law and Economics group further argues that if just cause discharge was
good for the employment relationship, then employers, looking out for their own
best interest, would offer that to employees without being required to do so by the
law. See id. Individual companies, nevertheless, present models of cooperative ef-
forts that use guaranteed employment and individual productivity for compensa-
tion, which effectively refutes the Law and Economics adversarial self-interest
modeL See infra Section IV.-C.-4.
Additionally, the Law and Economics group argues that employees would bar-
gain for just cause if they wanted it. See Frantz, supra note 1, at 595. Individual
workers, however, are not capable of bargaining for job security. See infra notes 177-
181 and accompanying text. There is also no organized group of wrongfully dis-
charged former employees. People do not want to talk about their termination. See
generally KATES, supra note 7. Most terminated workers are depressed after being
fired or spend most of their time trying to obtain another job, not organizing groups
to change the at-wil employment rule. See id. This is in sharp contrast to individual
groups who have federal statutory legal protection or to an individual employer who
has the weight of the law on his side and does not have to explain to anyone why an
employee was fired. See infra Part m.
The purpose of law is not primarily economic efficiency but justice. At-will em-
ployment does not provide the justice that is guaranteed under our system of law.
For further information on Law and Economics, see generally Richard A. Ep-
stein, Law and Economics: Its Glorious Past and Cloudy Future, 64 U. CHI. L. REV.
1167 (1997) (describing briefly the history of the Law and Economics school of legal
theory); see also Martha C. Nussbaum, Flawed Foundations: The Philosophical Cri-
tique of (a Particular Type of) Economics, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1197 (1997); Gerald N.
Rosenberg, The Implementation of Constitutional Rights: Insights from Law and
Economics, 64 U. CI. L. REV. 1215 (1997); Cass R. Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of
Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997).
' See, e.g., Leslie v. St. Vincent New Hope, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 (S.D.
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cause standard for termination will foster stability of employ-
ment, job security for loyal and hardworking employees, and is
worth the risks of change."
Part I of this Note outlines the origin, nature, and judicial
adoption of employment at-will in the United States. Part HI ex-
amines the divergence in application of the employment at-will
doctrine among various states. Part HI discusses the protected
class status of certain groups of employees who are not at-will.
Part IV explores a just cause discharge standard, various state
statutory remedies, and ultimately recommends federal action to
change the employment at-will doctrine.
I. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
A. Origin of Employment At-Will in the United States
The traditional English master and servant employment
relationship consisted of mutual duties of both servant and mas-
ter.'4 The servant customarily served his master with fidelity
and loyalty'5 while the master provided care and the security of
employment for the faithful servant. Under this regime, the ser-
vant could not be terminated except for just cause.' These pro-
Ind. 1995) (applying Indiana state law, the federal court stated "[wihen asked to
change the rule or expand the exceptions, the Indiana courts have said that such a
fundamental change in public policy must come from the legislature"); Murphy v.
American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 89 (N.Y. 1983) (stating "a significant
change in our law is best left to the Legislature"); Randolph v. Dominion Bank of
Middle Tenn., 826 S.W.2d 477, 480 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1991) (stating that creating an
exception to the at-will employment doctrine "is the prerogative of the Supreme
Court or the Legislature to make such changes if they are to be made"); Ising v.
Barnes Hosp., 674 S.W.2d 623, 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (discussing the New York
Court of Appeals decision in Murphy and declining to make an exception to the at-
will employment standard by deferring "to the legislature's superior vantage point
to reflect public policy"); Hartley v. Ocean Reef Club Inc., 476 So. 2d 1327, 1330 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (deciding "[ilf the rule of non-liability for termination of at-will
employment is to be tempered, it should be accomplished through a principled
statutory scheme, adopted after opportunity for public ventilation, rather than in
consequence of judicial resolution of the partisan arguments of individual adversar-
ial litigants").
1 "If you can't offer workers job security, how can you expect them to be com-
mitted to the future of the company? How can you be serious about empowering
them when, at any moment, you may rob them of their livelihoods?" Ronald Henk-
off, Getting Beyond Downsizing, FORTUNE, Jan. 10, 1994, at 62.
U See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, § 1.2, at 5.
'r See H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT § 83, at
166 (1877).
'6 See id. § 116, at 220.
19981
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scribed duties differed, however, within the agricultural set-
ting.'7 The English rule for agricultural employees who did not
possess a specific employment contract was deemed to be one
year-the specified time of an agricultural season. 8
The United States rejected the English master and servant
model, and instead adopted an employment at-will doctrine. 9
The employment at-will standard, formally enunciated by H. G.
Wood in "A Treatise on the Law of Master and Servant" in 1877,
stated: "the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring
is prima facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it
out a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by
proof."20 The rule provides that a contract for an indefinite term
is presumed to be at-will with the result that employment can be
terminated at any time by either party for any reason.
B. Nature of Employment At-Will
The traditional driving force in the employment at-will pol-
17 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, § 1.4, at 9.
'8 See id.
9See Deborah A. Ballam, The Development of the Employment At Will Rule Re-
visited. A Challenge to its Origins as Based in the Development of Advanced Capital-
ism, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 75 (1995) (examining the role of the judiciary in develop-
ing and adopting the employment at-will doctrine).
20 WOOD, supra note 15, § 134, at 272.
'The traditional view is that the English annual hiring rule was brought to this
country during colonial times and remained unchanged until the late-nineteenth
century when U.S. courts adopted the employment at will doctrine." Ballam, supra
note 19, at 86. Deborah Ballam, Associate Professor at Ohio State University, Fisher
College of Business, argues that the employment at-will rule developed because of
economic conditions: a great supply of free land, labor shortages, and high labor
costs. See id. at 87-88 n.86. Workers obtained jobs to acquire capital for farms of
their own and they did not want long term commitments to one master. See id.
Employers, on the other hand, did not want to be locked into long term high labor
costs. See id. "In addition, employers who did want permanence in their labor force
used either slaves or indentured servants ... [who] would [not] have been affected by
an automatic rule of annual hiring because slavery was not a contractual relation-
ship and indentured servants had express contracts for specified durations." Id.
This analysis, however, is not the last word on the subject. There is consider-
able debate on the reasons for judicial adoption of employment at-will into the com-
mon law. Some scholars argue that changes in U.S. legal doctrines were influenced
by the judiciary's desire to foster a favorable climate for the development of busi-
ness. See id. at 77-81. Jay Feinman, a Marxist scholar, asserted that the employ-
ment at-will doctrine "is the ultimate guarantor of the capitalist's authority over the
worker." Id. at 83 (quoting Jay Feinman, The Development of the Employment at
Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 132-33 (1976)).
The reasons why courts adopted the rule of employment at-will is not critical to
this Note. The consequences of the rule, however, are important.
[Vol. 72:141
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icy is the law of contracts.21 When an employer-employee rela-
tionship is not determined by an express contract and there is a
dispute as to an employer's right to fire an employee or an em-
ployee's right to quit, employment at-will is the "gap filler" or
"default rule."' "Gap-fillers" are those terms that contracting
parties would have inserted in the contract had they bargained
for them. In the event of a dispute between the parties, a court
simply fills in the gaps within a contract (or, in this context, the
employment relationship) with these "gap-fillers;" the terms the
parties presumably intended when making the contract.' Al-
though employment at-will has been deemed the default rule, it
is debatable whether the employee would actually agree to be at-
will if he or she had the knowledge and power to bargain for the
terms of employment.'
C. Judicial Adoption of At-Will Employment
The first judicial statement regarding the employment at-
will doctrine was made in 1884 by the Supreme Court of Tennes-
see in Payne v. Western & Atlantic Railroad Co.'
All may dismiss their employees at will, be they many or few,
for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong,
without being thereby guilty of legal wrong. The sufficient and
21 Even where there is a contractual employment relationship, the remedy for
breach cannot be specific performance because it is violative of public policy to force
any person to work for another, even for compensation, because it is too much akin
to involuntary servitude. See EDWARD YORIO, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT § 14.2, at
357-58 (1989).
22See 1 ARTHUR L. CORBiN, CORBim ON CONTRACTS § 4.2, at 560 (1993) (stating
that courts interpret contracts by "filling [the] gaps by reasonable implications"); see
also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87 (1989) (stating that "[diefault
rules fill the gaps in incomplete contracts").
23 See CORBIN, § 4.1, at 533. "If the parties have concluded a transaction in
which it appears that they intend to make a contract, the court should not frustrate
their intentions if it is possible to reach a fair and just result, even though this re-
quires a choice among conflicting meanings and the filling of some gaps that the
parties have left." Id.; see also HOWARD 0. HUNTER, MODERN LAW OF CONTRACTS, §
13.02, at 13-10 (1987).
24 Unionized employees always bargain for job security and can attain it because
of the collective power of the unions. See J. Houlte Verkerke, An Empirical Perspec-
tive on Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: Resolving the Just Cause Debate,
1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 890 (declaring that "[olne of the many distinguishing fea-
tures of union employment is the fact that virtually all collective bargaining agree-
ments include just cause protection").
2 81 Tenn. 507 (1884).
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conclusive answer to the many plausible arguments to the con-
trary, portraying the evil to workmen and to others from the ex-
ercise of such authority by the great and strong, is: They have
the right to discharge their employees. The law cannot compel
them to employ workmen, nor to keep them employed.26
United States courts followed the employment at-will phi-
losophy almost without exception until the 1974 seminal New
Hampshire case of Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,27 involving a
worker who was fired because she resisted her foreman's sexual
advances. Since that time, exceptions to the doctrine have been
carved out in both federal and state anti-discrimination stat-
utes.2 The states eventually came to recognize three major ex-
ceptions: first, breach of an express or implied promise; 9 second,
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy;0 and third,
26 Id. at 519-20.
27 316 A.2d 549 (N.H. 1974) (upholding the jury verdict which found that the
employer acted maliciously in terminating an employee).
28 See infra text Part I1.-A.
"Under the implied contract doctrine, employer representations regarding the
job security of employees and/or the manner in which termination decisions are to
be made are treated by courts as enforceable, contractual provisions, even though
an express contract is absent and employment would otherwise be at will." David J.
Walsh & Joshua L. Schwarz, State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Doctrines: Up-
Date, Refinement, and Rationales, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 645, 646-47 (1996). These ex-
ceptions, based on contract law, include contracts implied from employee applica-
tions, handbooks, and oral promises. See Maureen S. Binetti, The Employment-At-
Will Doctrine: Have Its Exceptions Swallowed the Rule? Common Law Limitations
Upon An Employer's Control Over Employees-At-Will, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION
CLAIMS 1997, at 499 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No. H4-
5257, 1997). "Today, most states' courts have ruled that these instruments
[employee handbooks] may articulate terms of employment that constitute implied
contracts to which the employer is legally bound." Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, Employee Handbooks/Personnel Manuals, in WRONGFUL TERMINATION
CLAIMS 1997, at 149, 163-64 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series
No. H4-5257, 1997).
"0 "The doctrine [public policy exception] recognizes that the private interests of
employers may come into conflict with the public good, and that in order to effectu-
ate public policy, it is necessary that employers be prohibited from retaliating
against employees for acting as citizens ought to act." Walsh and Schwarz, supra
note 29, at 646.
The types of public policy exceptions include discharges for (1) employee refusal
to perform illegal actions, (2) employee reporting employer's illegal activity, (3) em-
ployee exercising personal rights under state law such as filing workers' compensa-
tion claims, and (4) performing a civic duty such as jury duty. See id. Included in
this category are state enacted "whistle blower" statutes that protect employees who
disclose illegal employer activity from retaliatory discharge by their employers. See
Binetti, supra note 29, at 549. These whistleblowing statutes, however, vary from
state to state in their level and kind of protection. See id. at 549-50.
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breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.3
Each of these exceptions is received by some states but not by
others, therefore, the at-will doctrine is not applied with any
consistency. 2
II. DIFFERENCES IN APPLICATION OF EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL
AMONG THE STATES
The 1980's ushered in an era in which state courts began
recognizing the aforementioned exceptions to the at-will em-
ployment relationship.' Most states now recognize the public
policy and implied contract exceptions, however, not the cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing." The acceptance and appli-
cation of these exceptions varies considerably from state to
state.35 The disparate enforcement of the at-will doctrine and its
exceptions among the states runs the gamut from a liberalized
at-will policy with several legislative exceptions in California 5 to
Public policy exceptions sound in contract or tort and "find as their bases a
public expression of policy that can be constitutional (federal or state), statutory, or
judicially articulated." Hernandez-Truyol, supra note 29, at 165.
3' The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing can sound in either tort or
contract. "While this exception does not create a 'for cause' limitation to the at-will
rule, its underpinnings in the parties' commitment not to do anything to impair the
rights of the other result in analysis that seeks to ensure that the intent of the par-
ties is carried out." Hernandez-Trayol, supra note 29, at 166.
The majority of jurisdictions continue to categorically refuse to accept the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing with respect to at-will employment.
Indeed, some extreme jurisdictions refuse to accept the covenant not only
in the at-will setting, but in the entire employment context. Other juris-
dictions acknowledge the covenant in the at-will setting only where the
employee states another claim, such as a violation of public policy or
breach of an implied contract.
Binetti, supra note 29, at 576.
32See Walsh & Shwarz, supra note 29, at 647 n.7, 675.
"See id. at 675.
'"See id.
"See iL at app. I (outlining state by state the type of doctrine adopted or re-
jected, the cases deciding state law, and the dates of adoption of the exception). The
authors observed, however, that
[D1eciding whether states have recognized or rejected particular doctrines
in their case law is not entirely straightforward, and there is noticeable
disagreement among ... sources. These discrepancies are likely accounted
for by differing dates of publication, use or non-use of federal court deci-
sions interpreting state law, substantial ambiguities within many of the
decisions themselves, and a tendency for the courts to fail to acknowledge
conflicting rulings.
Id at 647 n.7.
88 See, e.g., CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102 (West 1989) (titled "Employer prohibition of
disclosure of information by employee to government or law enforcement agency-,
1998]
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a very strict enforcement policy in New York. 7 Most states, like
Michigan, are somewhere in between geographically, philosophi-
cally, and legally.8 An examination of the most significant de-
velopments in states on either end of the spectrum as well as
those in the middle represents the range of the application of the
at-will doctrine in the United States.
A California
The California legislature codified the employment at-will
doctrine in California Labor Code section 2922.29 However, de-
spite this statute, the California courts decided to recognize the
three common exceptions to the at-will doctrine.
1. Implied Contract
Wayne Pugh was fired by See's Candy, Inc. after thirty-two
years during which he worked his way up from a dishwasher to
Vice President.40 His career was punctuated by promotions, sal-
ary increases, and expanding responsibilities until the day he
was called into the office of the President and summarily dis-
charged without a reason.41 The employer asserted that Pugh
was an at-will employee who could be fired at any time, for any
or no reason, while Pugh countered that his employment rela-
tionship involved an implied contract requiring just cause dis-
charge.4 2 The court held that Pugh had offered a prima facie case
of wrongful termination in violation of his implied-in-fact con-
tract because of the following: 1) plaintiff's length of service; 2)
the promotions the plaintiff received; 3) the lack of any criticism
suspected violation or noncompliance to federal or state law; employer retaliation");
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12653 (West 1996 & Supp.) (entitled "Employer interference
with employee disclosures; liability of employer; remedies of employee"); see also in-
fra notes 39-97 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 125-155 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 98-124 and accompanying text.
"An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of
either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an em-
ployment for a period greater than one month." CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922 (West 1989).
Other states that have codified the at-will doctrine include Georgia in GA. CODE
ANN. § 34-7-1 (West, WESTLAW through 1997 sess.); Louisiana in LA. CIV. CODE
ANN. art. 2747 (West 1996); Montana in MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-503 (1997); North
Dakota in N.D. CENT. CODE § 34-03-01 (1987); and South Dakota in S.D. CODIFIED
ANN. § 60-1-4 (1v.ichie 1978).
See Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, 918-20 (Ct. App. 1981).
41 See id. at 919.
See id. at 918.
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regarding the plaintiffs work over the entire course of his thirty-
two years; 4) assurances of continued employment by the em-
ployer; and 5) the employer's known policies.' The court, thus,
considered the totality of the employment relationship in de-
termining that an implied-in-fact contract existed."
The Supreme Court of California in Foley v. Interactive Data
Corp., 5 affirmed the Pugh ruling stating "that Pugh correctly
applied basic contract principles in the employment context"
46
and that "the totality of the circumstances determines the nature
of the contract." 7 Moreover, the California Supreme Court sup-
ported an employee's "reasonable expectation[s]" of job security
from oral assurances, promotions, and salary increases, as well
as reliance upon personnel policies and manuals,4 as factors in
determining whether an employee was at-will or subject only to
just cause discharge. These factors extend far beyond the ex-
plicit written personnel manuals and employment applications
defining factors of just cause discharge that are required for
implied contracts in other jurisdictions.49
The California Supreme Court revisited the issue of the
wrongful discharge in violation of an implied contract in 1995 in
Scott v. Pacific Gas and Electric Co. There the court reiterated
its holding in Foley that the at-will presumption found in Cali-
fornia Labor Code section 2922 could be overcome by an implied-
in-fact contract based upon an "employer's course of conduct and
oral representations."51 Thus, there is no doubt that the law in
California supports an implied employment contract that may
arise from the "employer's official and unofficial policies and
practices."52
2. Public Policy
As early as 1959, California declared a public policy excep-
43 See id. at 927.
"See id at 926-27.
4765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (deciding that the jury could find an implied-in-fact
contract from the plaintiffs employment relationship).
"Id. at 384.
47 Id. at 388.
48id.
" For an example of a strict implied contract jurisdiction, see the New York
case of Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, infra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
904 P.2d 834 (Cal. 1995).
"Id. at 838.
r2 Id. at 839.
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tion to employment at-will in Petermann v. International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters.53 The plaintiff, a business agent for the de-
fendant union, was instructed to provide false testimony before a
committee of the California legislature. 54 The union fired the
plaintiff the day after he told the truth.55 While recognizing the
statutory right of an employer to discharge an employee at any
time for any reason, the court said that "[tlo hold that one's con-
tinued employment could be made contingent upon his commis-
sion of a felonious act at the instance of his employer would be to
encourage criminal conduct upon the part of both the employee
and employer and would serve to contaminate the honest ad-
ministration of public affairs."5 Thus, California established a
public policy exception. 57
In 1980, the Supreme Court of California, in Tameny v. At-
lantic Richfield Co.,58 interpreted the Petermann holding to pro-
hibit discharge of an employee who complied with a legal duty
even if not required to do so by a particular statute.59 The Pe-
termann court rested its decision on various California statutes
prohibiting peijury and the solicitation of peijury. ° In Tameny,
the defendant-employer requested that the plaintiff engage in
violations of anti-trust laws by coercing Atlantic Richfield Com-
pany ("ARCO") franchised retail gasoline stations to fix prices. 1
When the plaintiff refused, he was fired by Atlantic Richfield. 2
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1959).
See id. at 26.
"See id.
"Id. at 27.
57 The court admitted that "public policy" is difficult to define but it cited case
law and treatises for definitions. See id. at 27. "By 'public policy' is intended that
principle of law which holds that no citizen can lawfully do that which has a ten-
dency to be injurious to the public or against the public good." Id. (citing Safeway
Stores v. Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n, 261 P.2d 721, 726 (Cal. 1953)) (quoting Noble v.
City of Palo Alto, 264 P.2d 529, 530 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1928)) (emphasis added).
"[Plublic policy is the principles under which freedom of contract or private dealing
is restricted by law for the good of the community.' "Id. (quoting 72 C.J.S. Policy, at
212 (1955)).
"610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (deciding that an employee could bring a tort action
for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy).
59 Id. at 1333-34 (stating "fundamental principles of public policy and adherence
to the objectives underlying the state's penal statutes require the recognition of a
rule barring an employer from discharging an employee who has simply complied
with his legal duty and has refused to commit an illegal act").
6o Petermann, 344 P.2d at 27.
61 Tameny, 610 P.2d at 1331.
62See id. at 1332.
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The court held that an at-will employee who is discharged for re-
fusing to commit an act that contravenes public policy and who
has suffered damages as a result of such discharge may maintain
a tort action for wrongful discharge.' In both Petermann and
Tameny there were no specific statutes prohibiting an employer
from discharging an employee who refused to act unlawfully, but
both courts recognized a rule that did not allow an employer to
discharge a person who fulfilled a legal duty.
In Foley v. Interactive Data Corp.," the California Supreme
Court restricted the cause of action for "tortious discharge in
contravention of public policy"' by deciding that if the disclosure
of information to an employer about illegal conduct "serves only
the private interest of the employer"" then the discharged em-
ployee has no tort cause of action against his employer.67 In
Foley, the plaintiff, employed by the defendant subsidiary of
Chase Manhattan Bank, reported to his former supervisor that
his new immediate supervisor was under investigation by the
FBI for embezzlement at his previous job with Bank of Amer-
ica.8 The court acknowledged in a footnote that, after Foley's
discharge but before adjudication of his suit, his supervisor pled
guilty in federal court to the charge of embezzlement.69 The
court, nevertheless, concluded that the employee's disclosure
served only the employer's interest." Since, however, this su-
pervisor embezzled money from a national bank and was work-
ing in a subsidiary of another national bank,7 the court could
have concluded that the disclosure served to protect the financial
security of the public and to maintain the integrity of our na-
tional banking system. Instead the court held that the employee
had no legal duty to disclose this information to the employer, 2
thus, the embezzling supervisor could discharge Foley who had
See id. at 1336-37.
6 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988).
Id at 376 (capitalization omitted).
6 Id at 380.
67See id.
e8 Id. at 375.
' See id. at 375 n.1.7 See id at 380.
71 See id. at 375.
72See id. at 380 ("Whether or not there is a statutory duty requiring an em-
ployee to report information relevant to his employer's interest, we do not find a
substantial public policy prohibiting an employer from discharging an employee for
performing that duty.").
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no recourse to a cause of action sounding in tort.7"
The Supreme Court of California again addressed the ques-
tion of public policy exceptions to the at-will employment doc-
trine in Gantt v. Sentry Insurance.74 The court found that most
public policy exceptions are grounded in an employee's refusal to
violate a statute, perform a statutory obligation, exercise a
statutory right or privilege, or report an alleged violation of a
statute of public importance.75 The court acknowledged that,
since it was difficult to precisely define public policy, the best
solution was to ground public policy in legislative enactments
and constitutions.76 In Gantt, the plaintiff supported a fellow
employee's allegations of sexual harassment by her manager,
and testified in an interview with the Department of Fair Em-
ployment and Housing in California on behalf of the employee
against the interests of the employer.7 7 The employer retaliated
by changing Gantt's prior performance evaluation, demoting
him, and not providing him with a sufficient number of accounts
to perform his new position, resulting in constructive discharge.78
The Gantt court found that this case fell within the Petermann-
Tameny exception because the employee, despite coercion by the
employer, testified truthfully in an administrative investiga-
tion.7"
Thus, the public policy exception to the at-will presumption
recognized in California must be based upon a constitutional or
statutory obligation benefiting the public at large."0 It seems
that if Gantt had reported the sexual discrimination of a fellow
worker to a manager so that the manager could correct the
situation, but was not called to testify before an investigating
public agency, his actions would not have been protected against
retaliatory discharge by the employer.81 This situation seems
73 See id. at 374.
74 824 P.2d 680 (Cal. 1992).
76 See id at 684.
78 See id. at 687-88 ("A public policy exception carefully tethered to fundamental
policies that are delineated in constitutional or statutory provisions strikes the
proper balance among the interests of employers, employees and the public.").
77 Id at 682-83.
78 See id.
7 Id at 689.90 See generally supra notes 64-73 and accompanying text.81 See Gantt, 824 P.2d at 689. The court emphasized the need to protect employ-
ees who testify against their employer: "Nowhere in our society is the need greater
than in protecting well motivated employees who come forward to testify truthfully
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anomalous because it means that an employee cannot be pro-
tected for doing the "right thing" if he or she just reports wrong-
doing to the employer. An employee must testify before a gov-
ernment organization about an employer's wrongdoing before he
or she can be protected.
3. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
In Cleary v. American Airlines,82 the California Court of Ap-
peals found that there was a covenant of good faith and fair
dealing inherent in all contracts, including employment con-
tracts.8 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in a 1988 case'
enunciated two different approaches for the tort of breach of
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in the context of Califor-
nia employment law.' Where an employee was terminated, the
first approach considered the length of the employee's service
and the expressed policy of the employer."6 The second recog-
nized that an employer who breached a contract and who also
denied the existence of a contract acted in bad faith and was,
therefore, subject to tort liability.87
In 1988, the California Supreme Court in Foley v. Interactive
Data Corp., held that "tort remedies are not available for breach
of the implied covenant [of good faith and fair dealing] in an
employment contract to employees who allege that they have
been discharged in violation of the covenant,"' thus, the plain-
tiffs had a cause of action but could not receive tort damages.
in an administrative investigation of charges of discrimination based on sexual har-
assment." Id.
82 168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (Ct. App. 1980) (finding the length of service and the
employer's policy "operate[d] as a form of estoppel, precluding any discharge of such
an employee by the employer without good cause").
' Id. at 729.
84 See Huber v. Standard Ins. Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988) (denying sum-
mary judgment to the defendant insurance company for an alleged wrongful dis-
charge).
See id. at 983-84.
See id. at 984 (following the Foley approach that was later reversed by the
California Supreme Court).
"7 See id. at 984-85 (following the approach originally applied in Seaman's Direct
Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil, 686 P.2d 1158 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1984), later adopted
in Khana v. Microdata Corp., 215 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1985), and Koehrer v. Superior
Court, 226 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1986), and later reversed by the California Supreme
Court).
Id at 401 n.42 (stating that "Cleary ... and its progeny accordingly are disap-
proved to the extent that they permit a cause of action seeking tort remedies for
breach of the implied covenant").
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The court, however, did allow contract damage recovery for a
wrongfully discharged plaintiff who could prove an express or
implied contract. 9
In reinterpreting its Foley decision, the California Supreme
Court, in Lazar v. Superior Court,"0 clarified assertions in Foley
that any extension of tort remedies for an implied covenant
should come from the legislature and not the courts. 9' The
plaintiff in Lazar claimed Rykoff induced him to enter into an
employment contract with representations of the company's fi-
nancial soundness and personal job security and advancement.92
Relying on these representations, Lazar quit his New York job
and moved his family to California. 3 Two years later Lazar did
not receive the bonus compensation to which he was entitled and
was discharged.' He then brought suit against Rykoff for
fraudulent inducement of an employment contract.95 The defen-
dant employer asked the court, under a Foley analysis, to restrict
the plaintiff to contract remedies.98 While granting a tort remedy
in Lazar, the court distinguished Foley by stating that "Foley
was a contract case in which we declined to expand the availabil-
ity of tort remedies for breach of contract" while Lazar is "a tort
case in which we are being asked by [the] defendant to constrict
traditional tort remedies."9" Thus, tort remedies, except for a
breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, are available
for breach of an employment contract in California.
B. Michigan
Michigan recognizes a cause of action for wrongful discharge
in violation of public policy as well as a limited right to an im-
plied contract for just cause discharge based on written repre-
sentations by employers. However, it completely denies any
cause of action based on a covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing.
8See id. at 400-01.
® 909 P.2d 981 (Cal. 1996).
9 Id- at 989 (exercising "judicial restraint" by deferring to the legislature).
9I2& at 983.
"See id. at 984.
"See id.
5See i&
" See id, at 990.




The Supreme Court of Michigan first recognized a cause of
action for wrongful discharge based on an implied contract in
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield,9" a case combining the
appeals of two separate decisions of the Michigan Court of Ap-
peals' that found opposite results on factual circumstances. The
Michigan Supreme Court stated that the two cases were indis-
tinguishable. °" The plaintiffs in both cases inquired into the
company's job security policy before accepting their positions and
the interviewers assured them that they would be employed as
long as they performed their jobs.'' However, each plaintiff was
terminated without cause after he had worked for a number of
years for his employer. The court stated that it was a factual
question for the jury to decide whether these employment rela-
tionships were at-will or whether they constituted contracts for
employment that allowed only just cause discharge.0 2 The court
held that "an employer's express agreement to terminate only for
cause, or statements of company policy and procedure to that ef-
fect, can give rise to rights enforceable in contract," 3 even if the
term of the contract is indefinite, the provision of just cause was
an oral representation, or the provision was "a result of an em-
ployee's legitimate expectations grounded in an employer's policy
statements.""'4 Several decisions by Michigan courts since Tous-
saint have limited its expansive holding.
In 1987, the United States Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
asked the Supreme Court of Michigan to certify the question
whether an employer may change a written just cause discharge
s 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (finding that an employer's oral assurances in
hiring an employee that discharge is for just cause only is enforceable even where
the contract is not for a definite term).
9See Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 262 N.W.2d 848 (Mich.
App. 1977) (finding for the defendant); Ebling v. Masco Corp., 261 N.W.2d 74 (Mich.
App. 1977) (finding for the plaintiff).
10 See Toussaint, 292 N.W.2d at 884.
'01 See id. at 890.
112 See id. at 884.
103 Id at 890.
'4 Id. at 885. While both appeals were decided in the employee's favor, the court
stated that Toussaint had a stronger case than Ebling because Toussaint "was
handed a manual of Blue Cross personnel policies which reinforced the oral assur-
ance of job security." Id. at 884. It was not necessary, however, for Toussaint to
prove reliance on policies stated in the manual to prevail on his claim of wrongful
discharge. See id& at 885.
19981
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
policy to an at-will policy without having reserved the right to do
so." 5 The Supreme Court responded in the affirmative.10 6 Thus,
an employee hired with specific oral and written assurances of
just cause discharge may become an at-will employee at the sole
discretion of the employer who subsequently issues a new hand-
book.
107
In Rowe v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the Michigan Supreme
Court further limited Toussaint by finding that there must be
mutual assent by the employer and the employee to a provision
for permanent employment and that oral statements are
"insufficient to rise to the level of an agreement providing termi-
nation only for just cause."08 The Rowe court distinguished
Toussaint, by stating that: 1) the plaintiff, Toussaint, inquired
about job security; 2) he engaged in pre-employment negotiations
pertaining to job security; 3) there was a meeting of the minds
regarding the terms of his employment; and 4) since Toussaint
sought a unique position, his terms of employment were specifi-
cally negotiated.'0 9 Thus, in Michigan, language in an employer's
manual stating that all employees are at-will may abrogate any
other language or agreements that imply a just cause discharge
policy or any reasonable expectations an employee may have had
based on an employer's previous policies."0
In the 1993 case of Rood v. General Dynamics Corp.,"' the
court found that an employee handbook implied a discharge for
just cause only, but found that "where an employer establishes a
policy of discharge for cause, it may become part of an employ-
ment contract only when the circumstances ... clearly and un-
ambiguously indicate that the parties so intended."" The court
105 See In re Certified Question (Bankey v. Storer Broad. Co.), 443 N.W.2d 112,
114 (Mich. 1989) ("Toussaint modified the presumptive rule of employment-at-will
by finding that a written discharge-for-cause employment policy may become legally
enforceable in contract.").
o See id. at 121.
107 See Valerie Shea, Doing it by the Book: Drafting and Defending Employee
Handbooks, FOR THE DEF., Nov. 1997, at 16.
108 473 N.W.2d 268, 274 (Mich. 1991) (finding that an employer's handbook that
sets forth an at-will relationship, if distributed to employees, is proof of employment
at-will).
109 Id. at 274. While the Michigan Supreme Court limited Toussaint, the court
did not overrule its prior decision. Id. at 278.
0 See id. at 276-77.
.' 507 N.W.2d 591 (Mich. 1993).
'1 Id. at 606 (stating that the court must use an objective test in evaluating
whether an employer had a just cause or an at-will employment policy).
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decided that a plaintiffs subjective belief that he had job security
as a truck driver because he received assurances that he would
be with the company until retirement, as an inducement for him
to relinquish his seniority and accept a transfer, did not rise to
the level of an implied contract for just cause discharge."'
2. Public Policy
In Sventko v. Kroeger Co.," the plaintiff was injured on the
job and was terminated after receiving short term disability
payments under workers' compensation."5 The plaintiff claimed
that she was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensa-
tion claim."6 The Michigan workers' compensation statute pro-
hibited employers from discharging employees before they quali-
fied for compensation but did not deal with retaliatory discharge
for filing a claim."7 While the court found that the plaintiff was
an at-will employee, it stated that an employer may not termi-
nate an employee when the employer's reason for discharge
"contravene[s] the public policy," even where a statute does not
prohibit such retaliatory discharge."' The court concluded that
since employers benefit from the workers' compensation statute
by avoiding liability for employee injuries, employers cannot use
the statute's omission of a specific provision against employees
by asserting a right to terminate those employees who claim
benefits under the statute."'
3. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Michigan clearly does not recognize a cause of action for
breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing for
an at-will employee." The Michigan Court of Appeals, in Cock-
"' See id. at 599-601.
14 245 N.W.2d 151, 153 (Mich. 1976) (finding that an employer may not termi-
nate an employee at-will when the reason for the discharge violates the state's pub-
lic policy).
15 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. § 418.125 (West 1997) (stating that an em-
ployer "who consistently discharges employees within the minimum time specified
... and replaces such [workers] ... will be presumed to have discharged them to
evade the provisions of this act ...").
"a See Sventko, 245 N.W.2d at 152.
7 See id. at 154.
118 Id. at 153.
9 See id. at 153-54.
' See Cockels v. International Bus. Expositions, 406 N.W.2d 465 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1987) (deciding there is no cause of action for a breach of the covenant of good
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els v. International Business Expositions," stated that "an em-
ployer may terminate an employee arbitrarily and capriciously
absent a violation of public policy or an agreement to the con-
trary."M Moreover, Michigan refused to recognize a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing for employees who have a guarantee
of just cause discharge.' However, judicial inquiry into an im-
plied duty of good faith may be relevant when an employee may
be entitled to damages for an alleged breach of a "just cause
employment contract" by an employer.'
C. New York
One of the strictest jurisdictions for at-will employment en-
forcement is New York."' In 1895, the New York Court of Ap-
peals, in the case of Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co.," in-
scribed the doctrine of employment at-will into the law of New
York. After considering the legal effect of a "general hiring," the
court adopted the doctrine of Horace Wood"7 and enforced the





Until the 1982 case of Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, 9 the New
faith and fair dealing in Michigan).
121 idL
12Id
2' See Dahlman v. Oakland Univ., 432 N.W.2d 304, 306 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988)
(stating that recognition of a claim would be a "radical departure from the common
law and Michigan precedent [and, therefore,] should come only from the Supreme
Court").
124 Hammond v. United of Oakland, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 652, 655 (Mich. Ct. App.
1992) (citing Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich., 292 N.W.2d 880, 896
(Mich. 1980) (stating that an employee who secures a promise not to be discharged
except for good cause contracts for more than a mere promise by an employer to act
in good faith)).
"wSee Gary Minda & Katie R. Raab, Time For An Unjust Dismissal Statute in
New York, 54 BROO. L. REv. 1137, 1209 (1989) (stating "common-law remedies for
unjust dismissal have been largely nonexistent in New York for nearly one hundred
years").
"642 N.E. 416, 417 (N.Y. 1895) (rejecting the plaintiffs argument that a yearly
or monthly salary mandates continued employment for the particular time period
mentioned and declaring that the time period merely establishes a rate of compen-
sation in an employment contract that remains terminable at the will of either
Pt'See i& at 417; see also supra text accompanying notes 15, 20.
Martin, 42 N.E. at 417 (emphasis omitted).
443 N.E.2d 441 (N.Y. 1982) (distinguishing Martin v. New York Life Insur-
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York courts strictly adhered to the at-will doctrine and did not
allow any exceptions. In Weiner, the plaintiff, relying upon vari-
ous oral representations, his employment application, and the
employer's handbook, claimed that he suffered from a breach of
contract without "just and sufficient cause" when he was dis-
charged. 30 The New York Court of Appeals, considering the
"totality of all ... the attendant circumstances,"' found that
McGraw-Hill had made oral assurances in soliciting Weiner as
an employee, had given him an employee handbook stating that
the dismissal policy was only for cause, and had used wording on
the employment application that, taken together, showed an
implied contract. Weiner's reliance upon these 'promises' in-
duced him to quit his job and to join McGraw-Hill."12 Thus, in
New York, an employee must show that he or she received
promises from the employer regarding just cause discharge and
relied on these assurances in accepting employment for the court
to imply an employer's guarantees to dismiss for cause only.
2. Public Policy
In Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 3 an account-
ant, an employee with a twenty-three year tenure, brought a
wrongful discharge action against his employer after allegedly
being fired in retaliation for disclosing corporate accounting im-
proprieties to top management. The New York Court of Appeals
held that the plaintiff was an at-will employee and the employer
could fire him at any time for any reason.' The court recognized
that other jurisdictions allow a cause of action for terminations
that violate public policy, especially where employees disclose
their employer's illegal activities." The court, however, declared
ance Co. by finding it was a case that was decided in the time of laissez-faire eco-
nomic and legal policy).
" Id at 442.
"* Id at 446.See id. at 445.
u3 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983).See id. at 90.
See id. at 89. Murphy, an accountant, who was obligated by the very nature
of his job to report any irregularities, was fired for doing what was expressly re-
quired. This was a violation by the employer of good faith. In his dissent, Judge
Meyer argued that "It]he at-will rule was created by the courts and can properly be
changed by the courts but, more importantly, ... the rule has for at least a century
been subject to the 'universal force' of the good faith rule." I& at 97; see also Verk-
erke, supra note 24, at 862 (noting "Murphy illustrates nothing more than the oft-
repeated position of the New York Court of Appeals that employees must look to the
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
that any adoption of this cause of action should come from the
legislature.' s
In response to the perceived injustice in Murphy, the New
York state legislature passed a 'whistleblower' statute prohibit-
ing retaliatory action by an employer against an employee who
discloses an illegal employer practice."7 The courts, however,
have narrowed the scope of this law. In Easterson v. Long Island
Jewish Medical Center,"8 the Appellate Division in New York
upheld the firing of a nurse who refused to violate state laws by
handing over the medical records of another employee to a su-
pervisor."9 The court held that "[e]ven assuming that the disclo-
sure of the medical records was in violation of the cited provi-
sions of the Education Law and regulations, the defendant's
alleged wrongdoing did not threaten the health or safety of the
public at large."40 Even though the nurse was fired for refusing
to violate state law, the court refused to give her recourse
against her employer. Consequently, New York's whistleblower
law only protects employee disclosure of employer conduct that
threatens public health or safety, such as environmental pollut-
legislature rather than the courts to effect any change in the doctrine of employ-
ment at will").
The plaintiff also brought suit under New York age discrimination legislation.
Seven years after his other four causes of action were dismissed, the age discrimi-
nation claim was still being litigated, probably because the primary retaliatory rea-
son for his firing gave him no cause of action, thus, leaving a suit on his protected
class status his only possible recourse. See Gary Minda, Employment Law, 42
SYRACUSE L. REV. 491, 493 n.8 (1991).
See Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 89.
N. Y. LAB. LAW § 740 (McKinney 1990) provides in pertinent part:
2. Prohibitions. An employer shall not take any retaliatory personnel ac-
tion against an employee because such employee does any of the following.
(a) discloses, or threatens to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body an
activity, policy or practice of the employer that is in violation of law, rule or
regulation which violation creates and presents a substantial and specific
danger to the public health or safety;, ... (c) objects to, or refuses to partici-
pate in any such activity, policy or practice in violation of a law, rule or
regulation.
Id.
549 N.Y.S.2d 135 (App. Div. 1989).
s N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6509(9) (McKinney 1990) states in pertinent part that pro-
fessional misconduct is "[clommitting unprofessional conduct, as defined by the
board of regents in its rules or by the commissioner in regulations approved by the
board of regents" and N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 8, § 29.1(b)(8) (1997) de-
fines in pertinent part unprofessional conduct as "revealing of personally identifi-
able facts, data or information obtained in a professional capacity without the prior
consent of the patient or client, except as authorized or required by law."
"0 Easterson, 549 N.Y.S.2d at 136.
[Vol. 72:141
AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT
ing or tainting the public blood supply. The statute, therefore,
did not help Easterson and would not have shielded Murphy's
ethical actions from employer retaliation.
In the 1987 case, Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc.,' an em-
ployee, a Director of Financial Projects, 2 brought suit against
his employer claiming his refusal to participate in allegedly ille-
gal financial activities resulted in his wrongful discharge. To
overcome the presumption of employment at-will, the plaintiff
claimed he was following practices required by the company's
personnel manual and the "Accounting Code."' The court held
that "the 'Accounting Code' and statement on the employment
application requiring Sterling employees to abide by company
rules do not, taken together, rise to an express agreement that
Sterling would not dismiss an employee for following its policies
of full disclosure of business improprieties."' Professional em-
ployees in New York are left to decide whether to act ethically or
retain their jobs by not reporting illegal activity and thereby
opening the door to professional disciplinary action or possible
criminal and civil liability.
In a 1992 opinion, the New York Court of Appeals carved out
an exception to the at-will rule for Skala, an associate in a law
firm, who claimed that he was fired for insisting that his firm
report to the appellate division violations of the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility by another associate in the firm.'45 The al-
leged violations involved the neglect by another associate of
Skala's personal real estate deal. 46 The court distinguished
Murphy and Sabetay from Weider by finding that Murphy and
Sabetay both worked for large corporations and had accounting
responsibilities that were only part of their larger managerial
jobs, whereas associates in a law firm, as duly admitted mem-
bers of the bar, "remain independent officers of the court re-
sponsible in a broader public sense for their professional obliga-
141 506 N.E.2d 919 (N.Y. 1987).
42 Id.
43 1I at 920 (citing Sterling's Code of Corporate Conduct and Internal Control
Guide (together referred to as the "Accounting Code")).
'4Id. at 923.145 See Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992) (finding an exception to the
at-will employment for a law firm associate fired in retaliation for reporting an ethi-
cal code violation of another associate).
'4 See id. at 106.
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tions."'47 Thus, the court allowed a claim by plaintiff, Skala, for
breach of contract based on an implied-in-law obligation with his
employer law firm."4 It seems inequitable, however, for the
court to carve out an exception for a lawyer that reported unethi-
cal conduct that affected him personally and financially affected
him-the situation in Wieder, whereas the court in Murphy and
Sabetay permitted the discharge of managerial employees who
behaved ethically in the context of a corporation.
3. Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
New York has never recognized a cause of action in either
tort or contract for wrongful discharge based upon a covenant of
good faith and fair dealing. While recognizing that such a cove-
nant may be found or implied in a contract, the court specifically
stated in Murphy that in the at-will context, it would not make
sense to imply an obligation of good faith when an employer has
an "unfettered right to terminate the employment at any time."'49
III. PROTECTED CLASSES
Several groups of American workers receive protection from
discharge by their employers: statutorily protected classes of
workers, unionized workers, employees with contracts, and gov-
ernment employees. Although these groups have secured a
measure of protection in their employment, the negative aspects
of providing protection for certain persons, while leaving others
in society are totally unprotected, should not be ignored. 5" Em-
ployers are reluctant to hire persons in protected classes because
it will be more difficult to terminate their employment, even for
cause, in contrast to their ability to freely terminate at-will em-
ployees. Additionally, unprotected workers tend to resent those
with protection. Finally, justice requires an examination of the
at-will doctrine in a legal system that purports to have equality
under the law for all, yet allows and enforces protection for some
workers and no protection for others.
' Weider, 609 N.E.2d at 108.
28 See a
"9 Murphy, 448 N.E.2d at 91.
'60 See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1679.
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A. Classes Protected by Anti-Discrimination Statutes
In the last thirty five years, employment legislation in the
United States has changed dramatically. Large powerful corpo-
rations had the financial resources to lobby Congress and the
state legislatures to maintain employment at-will. Large groups
of non-unionized workers, however, who wanted jobs and were
excluded from obtaining and advancing in the labor market or-
ganized in the 1960's. Federal and state governments trans-
formed the employment climate by enacting civil rights legisla-
tion that gave special status to classes of persons who were
subject to past discrimination. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964'- prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, and national origin."2 Later, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA7)'5 3 outlawed dis-
crimination on the basis of age and the Americans With Dis-
abilities Act ("ADA)') guaranteed employment opportunities to
the disabled. State governments also have passed similar stat-
utes prohibiting discrimination. 5
As these groups obtained jobs and a measure of financial
success they were able to work toward the expansion and en-
forcement of those laws prohibiting employment discrimination.
The National Organization for Women " continuously lobbies
'5' Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a), 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2 (West
1995 & Supp. 1997).
,52 See infra note 155, identifying similar state statutes.
"3 29 U.S.C.. §§ 621-634 (West 1985 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of age against persons over 40).
'" 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12101-12213 (West 1995 & Supp. 1997) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation on the basis of disability).
"s States have enacted statutes similar to Title VII, 29 U.S.C.A. § 200e-2. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.220 (Michie 1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN § 41-1463(B)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-34-402 (West 1990); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 378-2 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 22-9-1-2 (West 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1009 (1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4572 (West 1989 & Supp. 1996);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-303 (1997); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A.7 (1995); N.Y.
EXEC. LAW § 296 (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1996); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955 (West
1996); TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051 (West 1996); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105
(Michie 1997).
"All fifty states have enacted statutes or ordinances prohibiting employer dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, gender, national origin, or religion." Eric
Mills Holmes, Solving the Insurance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma
In Light of The Human Genome Project, 85 KY. L.J. 503, 628 (citing MARVIN F. HILL,
JR. & JAMES A WRIGHT, EMPLOYEE LIFESTYLE AND OFF-DUTY CONDUCT REGU-
LATION 105-15 (1993)).
' See generally MYRA MARX FERREE & BETH B. HESS, CONTROVERSY AND
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Congress for modification of these laws and supports women in
various legal battles regarding employment-related discrimina-
tion. The American Association of Retired Persons... whose
membership age requirement is only fifty, lobbied to have the
ADEA revised and enforced for older workers. The National As-
sociation for the Advancement of Colored People5 and similar
organizations seek enforcement of Title VII for racial minorities
and have developed the power to enforce economic boycotts
against corporations that discriminate.59
Resentment of the various minority groups by the
"unprotected" arises when such groups are shielded from various
employment setbacks while others are still subjected to the un-
bridled whims of their employers. 60  Minorities, including
women, who are members of protected classes and who work side
by side with workers who have no protection, seem to be unfairly
privileged to those who have no protection and cannot bargain
for protection.16 The protections, however, for women and mi-
norities "may in fact be only an inadequate remedy for discrimi-
nation and superficial efforts by the employer to avoid litigation
and liability."162 Yet, these protections create feelings of distrust
and resentment among workers who have been divided into pro-
tected and unprotected classes by the law."
COALITION (rev. ed. 1994) (outlining thirty years of feminist movement); ROSALIND
ROSENBERG, DIVIDED LIVES (1992) (describing the influence of prominent women of
the twentieth century).
157 See CHARLES R. MORRIS, THE AARP (1996) (describing the history of the
American Association of Retired Persons and analyzing its political power).
8 See generally JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURTS, HOW A
DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION (1994).
" Corporate executives of the Texaco Corporation were accused of making ra-
cially discriminatory remarks and discriminating unlawfully in promotion practices
in the corporation. The Reverend Jesse Jackson organized a nationwide boycott of
Texaco oil products. See Bettina Boxall, Black Activists Press for Continued Boycott
of Texaco Bias, LA. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1996, at B3; Stephania H. Davis, Blacks Still
Plan Boycott of Texaco, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 17, 1996, at 24.
160 See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1679 (admitting that these observations are her
opinion).161 See id.
162 See id This Note does not advocate for the abolition of laws that try to alle-
viate the barriers and discrimination found in employment, but advocates for a just
cause basis for discharge for all workers so that there is a basic fairness in the em-
ployment relationship. The laws that are necessary to prevent specific instances of
societal discrimination and that attempt to compensate for past systemic discrimi-
nation against specific groups of workers must be retained.
16 There is controversy regarding the affirmative action programs in place to-
day. See generally Deborah C. Malamud, Values, Symbols, and Facts in the Affirma-
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[T]o the extent that employers see some identifiable classes of
employees ... as posing the risk of a costly discrimination charge
in case of discharge, a rational response is to discriminate-
illegally but probably undetectably-at the hiring stage. Per-
versely, the antidiscrimination laws may thus increase the in-
centive to discriminate in hiring .... [Ilt is not the antidiscrimi-
nation laws alone that generate these incentives; it is the gap
between the protection those laws afford to some identifiable
groups and the lack of protection that at-will affords to other
164
groups.
Finally, when an at-will employee in a protected class is
fired for lawful, though unfair reasons, he or she may have no
recourse against the employer except to sue on a protected class
status. "So the gap between the protections of the antidis-
crimination laws and the non-protections of at-will may push
employees to claim discrimination in response to perceived un-
fairness of any kind."1 66  This increases the number of employ-
ment discrimination cases while not providing the true needed
remedy: protection from the at-will rule.67
B. Unionized Workers
Unions represent groups of workers and negotiate with em-
ployers for benefits including but not limited to job security.6
tive Action Debate, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1668 (1997) (critiquing works of selected
authors on the topic of affirmative action); James Glassman, The Racial Divide: Af-
firmative Action is Demeaning, DENY. POST, Oct. 19, 1997 at F-06.
"4 See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1680 (arguing for adoption of just-cause dis-
charge in employment context); John J. Donohue I and Peter Siegelman, The
Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983,
1015-20 (1991) (noting that in 1985 charges of discrimination at termination out-
numbered similar charges at hiring by a ratio of six to one).
' See Estlund, supra note 1, at 1679.
Id. "Certainly if they consult an attorney about their legal options, they will
be encouraged to look for signs of discrimination." Id. For an example of a case
where an employee, fired mainly for being a whistleblower, sued on the basis of age
discrimination, see Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y.
1983).
'6 A requirement that employers show good reasons for discharge would
make it significantly harder for employers to fire employees for bad rea-
sons. A just cause requirement would thus support the strong public poli-
cies [outlawing discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex,
age, and disabilities] that underlie wrongful discharge law.
Estlund, supra note 1, at 1686.
8 See National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1994). Some
of the other benefits include graded warnings, the right to be heard and arbitration
in discharge.
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Thus, unionized workers generally are guaranteed the right to
organize and the freedom from arbitrary discharge, and they are
protected from the at-will rule by a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the union and the employer. 69 Many groups of
employees, including managerial employees, however, are spe-
cifically excluded from protection under our national labor laws.
Moreover, as economy has shifted from labor intensive to service
based, unions represent fewer workers.' While most service in-
dustry employees work at-will without contracts, a few excep-
tions exist.
C. Contractual Employees
Individuals possessing special skills have the bargaining
power to obtain a written contract of employment. 7' Executives
invariably can demand an employment contract. 72 Companies
that need a manager with a special talent try to lure individuals
from their current jobs by offering not only salary incentives but
also guaranteed compensation and a specific term of employ-
ment."3 Sales personnel who have loyal clients and who work on
commission have the ability to bargain for their terms of em-
ployment.'74 Additionally, individuals possessing unusual skills
169 See id. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating
Just Cause And Employment At Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 31 (1993) (arguing that
due to the bargaining power of unions, "the just-cause standard always governs
terminations among unionized workers").
'7 See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, at 438, tbl. 684 (116th ed. 1996). Union Member-
ship as a percent of employed and salaried workers in the United States declined
from 23.3% in 1983 to 16.7% in 1995. See id.
Unions, even at their height never represented a particularly large part of the
work force as they did, for example, in Great Britain. See generally CHARLES MORE,
THE INDUSTRIAL AGE: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN BRITAIN (1989).
171 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at § 9.2.
72 "The emphasis [in corporate hirings] now has to be placed on identifying good
managers, developing them and keeping them as long as possible." JOHN TARRNT,
PERKS AND PARACHUTES 23 (1997) (describing the reasons for executive contracts
and the process of negotiating them).
'73 Self-protection is the fundamental reason why employers ask employees to
sign contracts. The company wants to be protected against the employee's revealing
confidential information or becoming a competitor. The company also wants to be
protected against 'corporate anorexia,' the talent-starvation that can be a side effect
of downsizing and intensive cost-cutting. See id. at 75. Some of the contract guaran-
tees for an employee may be profit sharing, bonuses, stock options, life and health
insurance, retirement qualification, and penalties if the company decides to termi-
nate the contract early. See generally id. at 29.
174 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at § 9.2
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can demand employment contracts if such skills are in great de-
mand but short supply. 7' If the employee's contract term is for a
specific period of time he or she cannot be discharged except in
accordance with the terms of the contract. It seems, however,
that those persons who do not have special skills, experience or
education and, those who cannot bargain for a contract, need
protection from their employer, who perceives them as merely
dispensable inputs to production of a commodity or service.
D. Government Employees
Federal, state, and local government workers, known as civil
servants, enjoy protection from arbitrary discharge by the gov-
ernment'7 6 and a merit system rather than political patronage
determines promotion in their ranks.77 State government em-
ployees have a property right in their jobs guaranteed under the
Fourteenth Amendment." The question, thus, that arises is
why one group of workers should have a property interest in
their jobs while another group has none. 79 While it might be ar-
gued that civil servants need job protection, including property
rights in their jobs, because of possible changes in elected politi-
cal leadership, there is comparable risk in the private employ-
175 See id.
176 See Civil Service Act of 1883, 5 U.S.C. § 1101-1105 (1994 & Supp. 1996); Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 § 204 (a), 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994). These statutes govern
federal employees while various laws in each state protect state and municipal em-
ployees. See generally Melissa R. O'Rourke, Comment, Challenges to Performance
Appraisals of Federal Employees Under The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, 38
S.D. L. REV. 341 (1993) (discussing provisions of Civil Service Reform Act of 1978).
'77 See 5 U.S.C. § 7503 (1994) (requiring the government to give employees no-
tice for suspension and a reasonable time to respond). Federal or state employers
are specifically excluded from coverage under the National Labor Relations Act, see
29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1994).
'78 See, e.g., Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Reth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)
(stating that in the area of state public employment, a tenured college professor has
a property interest in continued employment under the U.S. Constitution's Four-
teenth Amendment procedural due process guarantees); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) (stating that the Ohio statute requiring just cause
for termination of state employees and an administrative review of discharge cre-
ated a property interest protected by the U.S. Constitution due process require-
ments).
179 At-will employees have no property interest in their jobs and some at-will
employees are not protected if they try to organize. See NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co.,
416 U.S. 267 (1974) (excluding managerial employees from the coverage of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act); NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (excluding
full-time university faculty members who have decision making authority from cov-
erage under the NLRA).
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ment sector where managers can promote their friends or corpo-
rate takeovers result in job survival for the corporate winners
who may not necessarily be the best employees.
IV. POSSIBLE REMEDIES FOR THE UNFAIRNESS OF EMPLOYMENT
AT-WILL
The at-will presumption favors employers because they have
superior knowledge, resources, and access to the law and to the
labor markets. The courts responsible for the common law at-
will doctrine, nevertheless, assert that if the at-will presumption
needs modification, the change should come from the legisla-
ture." Thus, the courts are unwilling to change the rule and the
state legislatures, despite years of court decisions stating change
must come from the legislature, also have refused to make any
changes. Employers continue to use the at-will presumption to
terminate unprotected employees for any reason. The situation
of discharge for cause only or a type of limited guaranteed em-
ployment in which both employers and employees are winners
presents a worthwhile alternative to the harshness of employ-
ment at-will,18' but it must come from another source: the federal
government.
A. Just Cause Discharge As a "Gap-filler"
As previously noted, when a default rule or gap-filler is used
in contracts, the court imposes a meaning in the contract that
the parties would have wanted if they could have or would have
'8 See, e.g., Murphy v. American Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983);
supra note 136 and accompanying text. But cf J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employ-
ment and the Common Law: A Modest Proposal To De-Marginalize Employment
Law, 81 IOWA L. REV. 347, 355 n.33 (1995) (stating "[iut is disingenuous for a court
to shrink from declaring the public policy of a state in the absence of legislation
when it blithely does so if that policy favors employers. The presumption of em-
ployment-at-will and its development into a 'rule' is entirely judge-made law"); Par-
nar v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 652 P.2d 625, 631 (Haw. 1982) (stating that
"[blecause the courts are a proper forum for modification of the judicially created at-
will doctrine, it is appropriate that we [the courts] correct inequities resulting from
harsh application of the doctrine") (citation omitted).
181 "A reversal of traditional employment-at-will practices could go a long way
toward inducing greater commitment to the organization and its real-world prob-
lems among professional employees." Joseph A. Raelin, Job Security for Profession-
als, PERSONNEL, July 1987, at 41. "[C]ommitment to job security will be viewed as a
commitment to the individual, who will probably respond in turn with increased
loyalty to the company." Id. at 42.
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contracted for it.'82 In the employment context, at-will is the
gapfiller. Thus, the law presumes that if the employer and em-
ployee had negotiated for the terms of their contract, they would
have wanted employment at-will. It seems unlikely, however,
that an employee with free choice would agree to be fired for any
or even no cause simply at the whim of his or her employer."i If
an employee could bargain, however, logic indicates that he
would not bargain away job security unless the employer offered
some very exceptional compensation."
Unfortunately, state courts have not adopted just cause as a
gapfiller in the employment relationship. Furthermore, state
legislatures have not passed legislation changing the judicial at-
will presumption, although advocates have clamored for decades
for relief from the harshness of the rule."
B. Existing Statutory Remedies
The Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Actem
and the Model Employment Termination Act 87 are two statutory
remedies open to examination.
In 1987, the Montana state legislature passed the Wrongful
Discharge from Employment Act ("WDEA")' that preempted all
' 2 Courts imply the default contract term that parties would insert in the con-
tract were they bargaining without costs and with full information. See CORBIN, su-
pra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
183 See Verkerke, supra note 24.
184 See Frantz, supra note 1, at 559.
18 See, e.g., Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge:
The Duty To Terminate Only In Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980) (urging
courts to imply a good faith discharge term instead of at-will in employment con-
tracts); Minda & Raab, supra note 125, at 1188-1209 (exploring the type of unjust
dismissal statute needed in New York and proposing a model statute for adoption);
Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germinates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads To-
ward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 70 (1988) (proposing a just cause dismissal
statute); Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time
for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 508-19 (1976) (proposing a state-level unjust dis-
missal statute based on arbitration law and experiences in the European countries
of France, Great Britain, Germany, and Sweden).
18a MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1997) (originally enacted as 1987
Mont. Laws 641). See generally Donald C. Robinson, The First Decade of Judicial
Interpretation of the Montana Wrongful Discharge From Employment Act (WDEA),
57 MONT. L. REV. 375 (1996) (discussing the Montana courts' interpretation of the
WDEA and its effects on Montana employment law).
18 7A U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1995).
1 MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-914 (1997) (originally enacted as 1987
Mont. Laws 641).
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
of Montana's common law decisions and statutorily adopted the
employment at-will concept with three express bases for a
wrongful discharge action. First, reporting of an employer's vio-
lation of public policy is a protected employee activity.18 9 Second,
the employee cannot be terminated except for "good cause" after
completing his or her probationary term of employment.'"'
Third, the employer is held to the terms of his or her own written
personnel policies and may not violate them in discharging an
employee. 9' The law limits damages for wrongful discharge to
four years compensation and does not permit punitive damages,
except where the employee can prove that the employer used
malice or fraud, and does not allow any other damages under
any other legal theory. 92 The statute advocates alternative dis-
pute resolution to settle termination claims 93 and employs the
award of costs and lawyer's fees as an inducement to the parties
to arbitrate not litigate. 94 When arbitration is agreed to by both
parties, it becomes the employee's only remedy.
At first glance, the statute seems to provide a remedy for
wrongful discharge, however, it should be noted that the law
codified employment at-will.'95 The Montana judiciary has re-
'8 See id. § 39-2-904 (1). This is the whistleblower protection.
190 Id. § 39-2-904(2). " 'Good cause' means reasonable job-related grounds for
dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties, disruption of the
employer's operation, or other legitimate business reason. The legal use of a lawful
product by an individual off the employer's premises during nonworking hours is not
a legitimate business reason, unless the employer acts within the provisions of 39-2-
313(3) or (4)." Id. § 39-2-903.
191 See id. § 39-2-904(3). Where an employer has written policies about discharge
procedure, the employer must give the employee notice and a written copy of the
policy within seven days of the discharge. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, § 9.20, at
566.5. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-905 (1997). This is seen as a negative provision
for older discharged workers who, because of their age, cannot find a new job and
thus may remain unemployed. "Indeed, in some cases workers in their forties and
fiffies may experience an extremely lengthy period of unemployment, particularly in
the occupational fields in which they may have devoted most of their working ca-
reers." Robinson, supra note 186, at 421-22 n.331 (citing M. Scott Regan, Tonak v.
Montana Bank Preemption, Interpretation, and Older Employees Under Montana's
Wronful Discharge from Employment Act, 56 MONT. L. REV. 585, 599-602 (1995)).
1 See MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-915 (1997).
194 See id. § 39-2-914. "A party who makes a valid offer to arbitrate that is not
accepted by the other party and who prevails in an action under this part is entitled
as an element of costs to reasonable attorney fees incurred subsequent to the date of
the offer." Id.
195 See id. § 39-2-902. The statute states in pertinent part "[elxcept as limited in
this part, employment having no specified term may be terminated at the will of ei-
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verted to pre-statute cases with a subjective standard of good
faith to interpret the new law.'96 In Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling
Company,9" the Supreme Court of Montana, interpreting the
WDEA, relied on case law decided prior to the Act to interpret
the Act's definition of "legitimate business reason." ' Although
the employer asserted that falling prices of crude oil required a
reduction in the work force, the plaintiff, a fifty-seven year old
executive vice president, showed that his performance was with-
out blemish and that the defendant employer hired a new person
to fill plaintiffs job within eight months of plaintiffs termina-
tion.'99 Justifying its grant of summary judgment to the em-
ployer, the court stated that "an employer is entitled to be moti-
vated by and serve its own legitimate business interest and must
be given discretion [regarding] who it will employ and retain in
employment."00 Thus, the Act, by eliminating employees' com-
mon law tort and contract causes of action and remedies, limit-
ing compensation, and placing the burden of proof on the plain-
tiff who has little access to the necessary employer documents,2 '
the Act provides less protection for the at-will employee than
former common law remedies. Scholars, moreover, looking at
the legislative history of the Act, argue that the statute was not
passed to protect employees from the harshness of the at-will
rule but was proposed and promoted by Montana's big business
ther the employer or the employee on notice to the other for any reason considered
sufficient by the terminating party." Id. While codifying "at-will," the legislature,
nevertheless, intended a limited just cause discharge by permitting three elements
for wrongful discharge. See i § 39-2-904.
18 See Parker, supra note 180, at 373 (stating "the Montana Supreme Court
erased any hopes of the employee that the statute would provide more protection").
197 797 P.2d 232 (Mont. 1990) (granting summary judgment to an employer who
offered a legitimate business reason for the employee's discharge).
19' Id. (citing Coombs v. Gamer Shoe Co., 778 P.2d 885, 887 (Mont. 1989); Hobbs
v. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, 771 P.2d 125, 130 (Mont. 1989); Flanigan v. Prudential
Fed. Says. & Loan Ass'n, 720 P.2d 257, 261 (Mont. 1986)). See Buck v. Billings Mont.
Chevrolet, Inc., 811 P.2d 537, 540 (Mont. 1991) (defining "legitimate business rea-
son" as "a reason that is neither false, whimsical, arbitrary or capricious, and it
must have some logical relationship to the needs of the business").
1"9 Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling, 797 P.2d at 233.
'" Id at 234 (citing "well-settled ... case law prior to the Act that economic
conditions constitute a 'legitimate business reason' ").
10' See Kestell v. Heritage Health Care Corp., 858 P.2d 3, 8 (Mont. 1993) (stating
that an employee has the burden of giving the jury evidence that the employer's
reasons for termination were false, arbitrary or capricious, and unrelated to the
needs of the business") (citing Cecil v. Cardinal Drilling Co., 797 P.2d 232, 235
(Mont. 1990)).
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lobby that sought relief from the large wrongful discharge set-
tlements of the 1980's.2°
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Law drafted the Model Employment Termination Act °' in
1991 for proposed state adoption. The Act would extinguish all
common law rights and claims of employees against their em-
ployers for wrongful termination and would substitute the statu-
tory remedy of good cause discharge after a probationary em-
ployment period of one year. Good cause under the Model Act
would include "both employee-specific reasons and good faith
business judgment reasons, " '° such as shutting down an opera-
tion on economic or institutional grounds, but not singling out a
particular employee for termination in a general layoff.25 The
provisions of the Act would be enforceable through arbitration2°
which can award reinstatement, back pay, a lump sum severance
pay, and attorney's fees and costs. The Act permits waiver of the
good cause requirement when the employer and employee agree
to a liquidated damages provision of one month's severance pay
for each year of service.0 7
Although the Conference drafted the Model Act for consid-
eration by all the states and the District of Columbia, none have
See Regan, supra note 192, at 585 (asserting that the Montana legislature
passed the WDEA to eliminate large employee awards and costly marginal claims as
well as to put certainty into employment law in view of the "Montana Supreme
Court's unpredictable interpretation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing").
[Tihe leading proponents of the Montana legislation were employer groups
whose main concerns were the run-away juries and the large damage
awards common in the 1980's .... Armed with a just cause' standard to en-
tice employee interest groups, Montana employers successfully extin-
guished magnanimous jury awards by restricting recovery to a showing of
no 'good cause,' limiting compensatory damages to lost wages, and raising
the level of proof for punitive damages.
Parker, supra note 180, at 373.
'7A U.L.A. 75 (Supp. 1995).
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 5, at § 9.20.2GSee id.
206 "The critical feature of the Model Act is its creation of an across the board
good-cause requirement for termination after one year of employment, enforceable
through an arbitration mechanism that is authorized to impose reinstatement as a
remedy for a wrongful discharge." Issacharoff, supra note 1, at 1791 n.28.
mo See Frank C. Morris, Jr., CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS IN EMPLOYMENT LAW
1996, SB07 ALI-ABA Course of Study: Selected Developments In Wrongful Dis-




adopted it. Instead, the Act has been the subject of much criti-
cism. One criticism is that all of an employee's common law
rights are extinguished by the Model Act, thus reducing the em-
ployee's protection from at-will discharge."' Others question the
limitation of damages0 9 and argue that the limitation on dam-
ages paid by the employer does not provide a deterrence against
employer wrongful conduct in the future.20 A third line of criti-
cism argues against using reinstatement as a favored remedy.
211
In addition, the Model Act is merely a suggested law, which
could be adopted differently, if at all, in each of the fifty states
and thus it does not alleviate the at-will burden on employees.
The enforcement provisions of the Montana WDEA and the
Model Act favor employers over employees, and therefore, are
not remedies that should be chosen over the common law pro-
tections available in those states that liberally construe em-
ployee rights.
C. Limited Guaranteed Employment
Because employers are free to hire or terminate workers at-
will, they tend to be less than careful in their hiring, retention,
and firing practices. 21 When employers are held only to a stan-
dard of "legitimate business decision," any decrease in profits,
213 See Dawn S. Perry, Comment, Deterring Egregious Violations of Public Pol-
icy: A Proposed Amendment to the Model Employment Termination Act, 67 WASH. L.
REV. 915, 915 (1992) (proposing a punitive damages provision to deter an employer's
"egregious violation of public policy").
2 Under traditional tort law, we readily compensate victims of legally rec-
ognized torts for physical injuries and accompanying pain and discomfort
.... [Under the Model Act, a wrongfully discharged employee can recover
nothing for the physical and/or psychological harm she has suffered. Her
recovery is limited to little more than a few dollars back pay. Under the
Act, it is the victim of the employer's wrong who bears the non-wage costs
of the employer's act, not the employer.
Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employ-
ment Termination Act, 43 AM. U. L. REV. 849, 915-16 (1994).
210 See id. at 916.
211 "Generally, reinstatement should not be favored for many of the same rea-
sons that the common law will not order specific performance of employment con-
tracts." Id. at 920.
212 This Note's proposed model envisions employer-employee cooperation and
trust with congruent goals rather than the union-management adversarial model
encompassed in U.S. labor relations statutes. See Roger E. Alcaly, Reinventing the
Corporation, N.Y. REV., Apr. 10, 1997, at 45 (discussing changes needed to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act to allow employer-employee cooperation in non-union
companies).
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demand for a product, or general economic change can be used to
justify the discharge of workers, even long-term productive
ones.
2 13
If companies were held to a higher standard, such as just
cause discharge, their focus on employment decisions would be
sharper and they would more carefully select, train, and develop
the skills of their employees.
1. Advantages
First, if employers were not free to fire employees at any
time for any reasons they would be more selective in recruiting
workers, which in turn would reduce their costs of turnover214
and the retraining of new hires. Second, a probationary period
in which the employee and employer get to know each other
would be an important part of a limited guaranteed employment
program. 2'5 This probationary period with no obligation on either
party has an advantage over contract employment where both
parties legally commit to a term of employment and financial
penalties even before the term begins. Third, the emphasis on
retention of workers leads to very positive results for the em-
ployer, the employee, and the economy.216 For example, employ-
ers will try to develop employee corporate loyalty and will be
more willing to invest in training and development for employees
who are committed to the company.217 Moreover, employee
213 As companies have delayered, restructured, and downsized, employees
who were already feeling distanced and detached have become more disil-
lusioned and even cynical. Too often, layoffs have been the aftermath of
grand corporate visions that promised personal opportunities. Companies
tout the 'partnerships' they have with their organization's members, then
shower them with pink slips. It's not surprising that employees are un-
likely to commit to new goals or values until they're convinced that the fu-
ture holds new opportunities for them.
Christopher A. Bartlett and Sumantra Ghoshal, Changing the Role of Top Manage-
ment: Beyond Strategy to Purpose, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1994, at 87.214 See Gillian Flynn, Attracting the Right Employees - and Keeping Them,
PERSONNEL J., Dec. 1994, at 44 (discussing steps, including selective recruiting and
training for new employees, that companies such as Texas Instrument, Corning Inc.,
Deloitte & Touche, and Hallmark have taken to reduce turnover).
2'5 A probationary period, for example, is provided for in Montana's WDEA. See
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-904(2) (1997).
216 See Henkoff, supra note 13, at 62-64 (discussing the positive effects of re-
structuring jobs rather than laying off employees, on the economy and in the work-
place, as evidenced by experiences of such companies as R.R. Donnelly, Raychem,
and Honeywell).
217 See id. at 62-64.
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"[plarticipative, entrepreneurial, and risk-taking behavior seem
to flow from a sense of job] security."21  Employers will find
employees making more contributions and innovations in the
work place when employees realize that they are valued in the
corporation and have a secure position.219
Some effective methods in limiting discharges include job
posting,'0 transfer of employees to another geographic location if
they have no job opening in the present location,2' and the use of
part time help in good times to limit the additions to the work-
force.2
2. Disadvantages
First, in the short term, it is more expensive for companies
to spend extra time and money on recruiting and hiring the best
218 Raelin, supra note 181, at 42. These are the opposite reactions of those em-
ployees who survive terminations and downsizing in their companies. If any relief is
felt by these employees, it is quickly "overwhelmed by a number of less-pleasant
emotions including pain, guilt, loneliness, depression and job insecurity." Caudron,
supra note 7, at 39. This emotional turmoil may have lasting ramifications for the
company itself. It has been reported that a "distressing 80% of downsizers admit
that the morale of their remaining employees has been mugged. These ... are the
very people who are supposed to revitalize your enterprise .... Henkoff, supra note
13, at 58.
219 See Alcaly, supra note 212, at 38 (asserting that without job security, work-
ers are reluctant to initiate efficient cost cutting procedures because they fear loss
of their own position).
220 Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing (3M) protects the jobs of its em-
ployees through what it calls the Unassigned List. People whose jobs are
eliminated are put on this list and are given first crack at any job opening
within the corporation for which they are qualified. Units with job open-
ings may not go outside the company to fill the positions until internal
candidates have been given full and complete consideration.
Peter Allan, Downsizing Strategies That Minimize Layoffs, AMi. Bus. REV., Jan.
1997 at 59.
23 "Clearly, it's cheaper to terminate a person in one place and hire another
one at the other end. But these investments bring a tenfold return in
terms of employee loyalty, creativity, and productivity." If workers know
that the company will move mountains - not to mention their families and
their household belongings - to help them find another position, then
they're much more likely to suggest ways to do things more efficiently.
Henkoff, supra note 13, at 64 (quoting Thomas Pierson, Manager of Human Re-
sources Planning).
22 See Allan, supra note 220, at 58-59. Contingent workers, including part-time,
seasonal, and contract workers allow for flexibility and protect the integrity of full-
time workers. See id.; see also Raelin, supra note 181, at 43 (describing the so-called
"buffer devices" such as using freelance help and sub-contractors to promote job se-
curity for professional personnel).
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workers for the job openings.m Second, companies view just
cause discharge or limited guaranteed employment as less flexi-
ble.us They can no longer hire to meet short term demands and
then lay off workers when demand slackens.2s Companies be-
lieve that it becomes difficult to terminate workers who perform
at a mediocre level. Third, companies believe that workers
whose jobs are "guaranteed" become complacent, lack creativity,
and are unmotivated. 6 Companies assume people need an ul-
tra-competitive atmosphere to attain high job performance and
advancement.
3. The Reality
Companies point to the problems with civil service workers
who appear unmotivated because their jobs and salaries are
guaranteed whether they perform well or poorly and to increased
costs of production for unionized workers whose jobs are not
subject to at-will discharge." 7 The real problem, however, is that
even where employees are motivated, work diligently, and ad-
vance, they can be terminated at any time for no reason in an at-
will world.2
In reaching their evaluation of motivation in a proposed just
cause discharge world, companies overlook profit motive as a key
factor. If companies were obligated to give their employees job
security, they would adapt their management techniques to ob-
tain all the advantages listed above because they would want to
2' See Alex Markels and Matt Murray, Slashed and Burned, WALL ST. J., May
14, 1996, at Al (estimating that it costs fifty thousand dollars to recruit and train a
managerial or technical worker).
224 See ARCHIBALD COX ET AL., LABOR LAW 999-1002 (12th ed. 1996) (discussing
the evolution of employment policies and contrasting the vast numbers of
"unemployed waiting at the gate" in 1900 with protected status of unionized work-
ers today).
2' See Gilbert Fuchsberg, Why Shake-Ups Work for Some, Not for Others, WALL
ST. J., Oct. 1, 1993, at B1 (discussing the study of organization lay-offs that revealed
more than half of the participating companies refilled eliminated positions within
one zear).
, See Frantz, supra note 1, at 567.
22 See Raelin, supra note 181, at 40. Guaranteed employment is so highly val-
ued in the union sector that unions have routinely made "wage, benefit, and work-
rule concessions for no-layoff provisions." Id.
m See Kent R. Davies, Is Individual Responsibility A Radical Idea in American
Business?, TRAINING, Nov. 1988, at 63 (opining that the disappearance of the Ameri-
can work ethic is due to the worker perception that they are dispensable commodi-
ties regardless of their performance).
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stay in business and make a profit.29 Motivators such as incen-
tive bonuses, compensation related to production, and advance-
ment tied to individual performance will encourage employees to
increase their productivity and improve their skills."0 Moreover,
many companies, especially large manufacturing companies,
have been unionized for decades and are still in business,"
They handle their employee relations and job security through a
collective bargaining agreement and arbitration.
4. A Model: Lincoln Electric
Lincoln Electric Company, established in 1895 and head-
quartered in Cleveland, Ohio, is the world's largest manufac-
turer of arc-welding equipment. s2 The history of the company
demonstrates an attitude of caring for employees both in train-
ing them to perform excellently on the job and in giving them
life-enhancing benefits. 3 Lincoln Electric provided employees
with a paid life-insurance policy in 1915, an association for
health benefits in 1919, two weeks paid vacation yearly in 1923,
a suggestion system in 1929, a profit-sharing bonus plan in 1934,
and a no-layoff policy in 1959.'
Lincoln hires new employees with extreme care. The turn-
over rate in the first three months during a probationary period
is twenty percent; 2 5 however, after probation, long-term turnover
22One such motivator may be cooperation throughout the business cycle. While
employees are guaranteed job security they will share profits in good times but also
be obliged to cut back on compensation in lean times. See generally Raelin, supra
note 181.
2' See Carolyn Wiley, Incentive Plan Pushes Production, PERSONNEL J., Aug.
1993, at 88 (outlining the history of Lincoln Electric's incentive plan).
23 "The higher productivity [in unionized establishments] is due in part to the
lower rate of turnover under unionism, improved managerial performance in re-
sponse to the union challenge, and generally cooperative labor-management rela-
tions at the plant level." Cox, supra note 224, at 91 (citing a 1984 study by R. Free-
man and J. Medoff, What Do Unions Do?).
232 See Raelin, supra note 181, at 46.
' See Hastings, Role of Incentives, supra note 10, at 137 (discussing founder
James J. Lincoln's endorsement of a management system that promotes employee
efficiency and results in employees who "work ... enthusiastically, have fun at their
jobs, and ... [who are] loyal and secure").
" See Wiley, supra note 230, at 88.
2' See id at 87. Workers accustomed to conventional benefits such as paid holi-
days or sick days, seniority preferences for promotions or reserved parking spots
need not apply for employment because Lincoln's merit-based system includes none
of these traditional perks. See id.
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is an extremely low two percent.2 " Lincoln constantly retrains
its employees so that they not only can do their own jobs, but
also can rise to higher skilled and better paying jobs in the fu-
ture.2" Thus, Lincoln encourages promotion from within its own
ranks.' Lincoln values the work experience of its employees,
which is evidenced by the fact that one-third of Lincoln's employ-
ees have worked there for more than twenty years. 9
A major thrust of strategic policy at Lincoln Electric is pro-
moting guaranteed employment24 "[n]ot as a right or entitle-
ment, but as a reward, a mutually beneficial agreement that
tightens the bond between the company and the employee, rec-
ognizing the value of good hard work and loyalty, and advancing
the prospect for further contributions in the future."2" While not
guaranteeing absolute lifetime employment, the company does
guarantee that any employee with three years of service will
work at least thirty hours per week, regardless of how slow
business might be. 2  Lincoln uses incentive bonuses, piecework
pay, and compensation tied to individual production.2" Each
employee must take responsibility for his or her own work. Any
component that is returned by a customer goes back to the origi-
nal employee who worked on it. 2" Lincoln then requires this
employee to fix the component on his or her own time without
any compensation; thus, there is a great incentive to do quality
work the first time.'
Chairman of the Board and CEO of Lincoln Electric, Donald
Hastings, said in a recent speech that "[tihe only way we'll have
See id.
2 The company has 94 different training programs to prepare people "to do a
better job for themselves and the company." Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, su-
pra note 8, at 692.
238 "The firm posts all promotional opportunities (including many senior posi-
tions), and bases promotions on merit only." Wiley, supra note 230, at 87.
2"' See Hastings, Role of Incentives, supra note 10, at 138.
210 "Lincoln guarantees work to employees with three years' experience. No one
has been laid off since 1948, and turnover is less than 4% among those with at least
180 days on the job." Zachary Schiller, A Model Incentive Plan Gets Caught in a
Vise, BUS. WFL, Jan. 22, 1996, at 89.41 Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, supra note 8, at 692.
242 See Wiley, supra note 230, at 90.
'4s See Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, supra note 8, at 693.
24 See Wiley, supra note 230, at 89 (discussing the quality assurance depart-
ment's function of identifying and returning defective parts to the responsible em-
ployee as an integral part of the employee's twice yearly review).See Davies, supra note 228, at 65.
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any kind of widespread job security in today's business environ-
ment is if we change our thinking as to what makes good man-
agement. Instead of praising corporations that downsize, we
need to look at their actions as admissions of failure, which is
what they really are." 6
Lincoln Electric has prospered with guaranteed employment
for its workers, has double the productivity rate of workers in
comparable businesses, and has satisfied customers. 7 In 1996
Lincoln had its forty-eighth consecutive year of operating with-
out a single layoff.m Even in 1992 when an expansion in Europe
created corporate losses and pressure to layoff workers, man-
agement resisted because they thought "it would destroy trust on
the part of [their] people."' 9 Instead, Lincoln used the creativity
and skill of its workers to find ways to cut costs and increase
production."0
Lincoln Electric has a specific corporate culture that is dedi-
cated to a limited guaranteed employment with a specific incen-
tive system."' The Lincoln Electric model provides proof that
guaranteed employment can be a workable, highly successful
program when the management of a company commits itself to
the concept. Companies, however, have shown reluctance to
change on their own and have resisted change even when chal-
lenged by models like Lincoln Electric. 2 Clearly, any change in
the use of at-will employment will not be voluntary.
2' Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, supra note 8, at 693. But see Norman
Halpern, Introduction: Challenges In Human Resources Utilization and the Impact
on Other Stakeholders From Globalization, Technological Advances, Restructuring,
and Downsizing, 22 CAN.-U.S. L.J. 309, 309-10 (stating that the other view is that
"downsizing, whether it be driven by restructuring, re-engineering, technology,
merger, or deregulation, is a sound, long-term strategy with due consideration for
the victims [and] [t]his helps a company compete effectively in the global economy
or in some cases even survive").2"7 See Hastings, Role of Incentives, supra note 10, at 137-38.
248 See id at 137.
249 Id. at 138.
m See id.; see also Wiley, supra note 230, at 91. Ten years earlier when demand
lagged behind production, Lincoln recruited fifty-four factory workers for the sales
force. See ida The experiment paid off handsomely, resulting in ten million dollars in
new sales. See id.
2" See generally Hastings, Guaranteed Employment, supra note 8.
212 See Alcaly, supra note 212, at 44-45 (stating "[wihat is clear is that manage-
ment opposition to collaborative arrangements is widespread ... [and] limited gov-
ernment action could help overcome these barriers").
1998]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
5. Proposed Federal Remedy
This Note proposes a federal statute that will require a just
cause standard for termination of any permanent employee. 3
The exact formulation of the statute, while beyond the scope of
this Note, could be modeled on federal anti-discrimination stat-
utes like Title VII.2 It would not be one akin to Montana's stat-
ute that codifies the employment at-will standard but rather a
statute that codifies just cause discharge. 5 The Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution certainly gives the
Congress the right to legislate in this area.25 Small local and
state businesses could be exempt as they are in Title VII.
Moreover, since states have followed the federal government in
prohibiting discrimination,' it is reasonable to believe that
states would adopt laws similar to a federal law for just cause
discharge.
A probationary period of employment that allows an at-will
termination should be permitted. However, after a reasonable
time period set for probation the just cause standard should ap-
ply. The statute should require the employer to prove that he or
she had just cause to terminate an employee because the em-
ployer is the party who has access to the documentation neces-
sary for proof. The burden of persuasion should remain with the
employer.
Employers and employees would not be permitted to con-
m" There are a number of scholars who have proposed federal statutes for just
cause discharge. See Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment At
Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443, 1509-24
(1996) (proposing a statute similar to the one in the Virgin Islands that requires just
cause discharge after a probationary period); Sprang, supra note 209, at 921
(proposing a federal statute modeled on Title VII requiring just cause discharge).
But see Parker, supra note 180, at 405 (arguing for expanded judicial protection for
at-will employees under tort and contract law interpretation).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
26 See supra notes 188-200 and accompanying text.
2 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power To ... regu-
late Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States." Id. Several
federal laws operate and preempt in the employment area already. Areas of federal
law preempting state law in the employment field include the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1994) (preempting state law regulating unions); Occu-
pational and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651-678 (1994) (preempting a state law
governing worker safety); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C. § 1320b-1 (1994) (preempting a state law governing employee benefit pro-
grams).
See supra note 155.
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tract around the just cause discharge requirement just as they
cannot contract around the ERISA benefits requirements or the
OSHA worker safety requirements. Temporary and part-time
employees, however, could be exempt from the statute.
To make the discharge adjudication process efficient, the
statute could provide for arbitration, a hearing before a Com-
mission such as the EEOC, and appeal to federal court. Reme-
dies should include back pay and benefits, reinstatement, if the
employee wishes, arbitration costs to be paid by the employer,
and punitive damages for an employer's egregious violation of
public policy.
Above all, the statute should promote all reasonable efforts
to afford a hard working employee the job security that is needed
and deserved over his or her lifetime.
CONCLUSION
State court judges, given the time and opportunity, have not
changed the employment at-will doctrine and have stated that
the legislatures should effect any modification of the law. State
governments have refused to change the at-will presumption and
several states have even codified the rule. While the common
law in many states recognizes exceptions to at-will employment,
there exists little consistency in doctrine or application from one
state to the next. At the same time, employers, adopting adver-
sarial and hierarchical management models, have adhered to the
convenience of at-will employment. The federal government
through legislation has given employment protection to numer-
ous groups of workers including federal employees, union mem-
bers, and persons subject to past discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, color, religion, national origin, disability, and age. The
result is that some workers have job security, some workers have
legal job protection from unlawful discrimination, and some
workers are totally unprotected. Since there are no other ave-
nues available for change, it is time for the federal government
to remedy the inequity of the employment at-will doctrine with
appropriate legislation.
Kathleen C. McGowan"
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